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Fiscal Policies and Exchange Rates
Early proponents of floating exchange rates
argued that floating rates would tend to insulate
countries from economic disturbancesoriginat"
ing outside their borders. They also suggested
that the real exchange rate (that is, the nominal
exchange rate adjusted for differences in the
general level of prices at home and abroad)
would be relatively constant. According to this
view, movements in the nominal exchange rate
would offset differences in inflation at home
and abroad, thereby stabilizing both the real
exchange rate and the balance of trade.
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates in 1973, the real
trade-weighted value of the dollar actually was
relatively stable until 1976. But then it dropped
20 percent between 1976 and 1979 and rose
over 60 percent from 1979 to 1985. By 1988 it
had dropped again, this time by 40 percent.
Obviously, the early view of floating exchange
rates failed to consider a key influence on the
real exchange rate, specifically, international
flows of financial capital. Contrary to the earlier
view that flows of goods and services primarily
determine the real exchange rate, it is now gen-
erally agreed that international capital flows have
been the principal reason for the recent swings in
the real value of the dollar. These capital flows
respond to a variety offactors, including mone-
tary and fiscal policies. In recent years, changes
in these government policies appear to have
been the most importance influence on capital
flows and exchange rates.
This Letter assesses the impact of u.s. and foreign
fiscal policies on the real value of the dollar dur-
ing the period of floating exchange rates and dis-
cusses some suggested policies for dealing with
the resulting instability in exchange rates. A sub-
sequent Letter will examine the role of shifts in
monetary policies.
The effect of fiscal policy.
Under a flexible exchange rate system, an ex-
pansionary fiscal policy, in the form of either an
expansion in government spending or a cut in
taxes, affects the value of the dollar through two
channels. First, a U.S. fiscal expansion increases
the demand for credit and therefore, tends to
raise U.S. real interest rates relative to those
abroad. The increased differential between U.S.
and foreign real interest rates encourages inves-
tors to purchase dollar-denominated assets, and
this increases the real value ofthe dollar.
Over time, the international mobility of capital
tends to eliminate such real interest rate differ-
entials across countries. Thus, if this were the
only influence on the dollar, the real exchange
rate would be expected ultimately to depreciate,
returning to its long-run equilibrium level. How-
ever, the dollar's value can be sustained at a
higher level even if no real interest rate differ-
ential exists if the market's expectation ofthe
long-run real value of the dollarchanges. This is
the second channel through whichexpansionary
fiscal policy can influence the.dollar's foreign
exchange value.
Under a floating exchange rate system, a sus-
tained fiscal expansion in the U.S. works to keep
the value of the dollar up in the future as it
continues to draw in capital from abroad. Thus,
when international investors expect a fiscal
expansion to be relatively permanent, they also
expect the real value of the dollar to remain high
in the future and therefore, bid up the current
value of the dollar.
Which is more important?
A macroeconometric model of the. U.S. economy
developed at the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco permits evaluation of the relative
importance of these two channels of fiscal policy.
The model shows that the expectations effect
from a fiscal expansion is quite .large compared
to the effect of changes in the interest rate dif-
ferential. According to this model, a fiscal ex-
pansion (holding the money stock constant)
immediately causes the expected long-run real
value of the dollar to rise. This change in expec-
tations causes a similarly abrupt increase in theFRBSF
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because the effects on the exchange rate are off-
setting. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, u.s.
and foreign fiscal policies generally were moving
in opposite directions, thus putting either upward
or downward pressure on the dollar. From 1973
to the late 1970s, foreign budget balances shifted
from surplus to deficit, thereby tending to depre-
ciatethe dollar. At the same time the u.s. budget
balance shifted from deficit toward surplus, also
tending to depreciate the dollar. In contrast,
during the 1980s foreign budget balances moved
sharply into surplus, and the u.S. budgetary
position shifted sharply into deficit, in both cases
tending to appreciate the real value of the dollar.
Chart 3 shows the model's estimated contribu-
tions of u.s. and foreign fiscal policy to the real
value of the dollar. During the 19705, movements
in U.S. and foreign fiscal policies each acted to
depreciate the real value of the dollar by about
10 percent, for a combined effect of 20 percent.
The real value of the trade-weighted dollar actu-
ally declined by 25. percent in this period. Thus,
divergent fiscal policies account for the lion's
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current, or spot, value of the dollar. The higher
dollar causes the trade balance to deteriorate.
With a larger trade deficit, there is a greater
volume of capital inflows, which actually works
to reduce upward pressure on interest rates.
Thus, although the interest rate differential rises
as a result of the fiscal expansion, the additional
capital inflows associated withthe expectations
effect minimize the extent of this rise and there-
fore its influence on the real value of the dollar.
CHART 1
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U.S. andforeign fiscal policies
If u.s. and foreign fiscat policies both expand or
contract together, onlythe level of world interest
rates and not the value of the dollar is affected
Because the rise in interest rates is so modest, a
large degree of the crowding out associated with
the fiscal expansion falls on net exports rather
than on interest-sensitive domestic sectors. This
crowding out occurs rather quickly. The model
shows that the decline in net exports (or rise in
net imports) after two years is nearly 70 percent
of the change in government spending (Chart 2).
Consequently, there is considerably less impact
on interest-sensitive expenditures than other
models have suggested.
Specifically, the model shows that after two
years an increase in government spendingequal
to one percent of GNP raises the real trade-
weighted value of the dollar by about six percent
through the expectations channel. The differ-
ential between real long-term bond rates also
rises, but by only 10 to 15 basis points. This
increase in the rate differential induces a modest
one to 1% percentage-point increase in the real
value of the dollar on top of the expectations
effect. See Chart 1.Movements in fiscal policies also helped to
appreciate the dollar from 1980 through 1985.
The tightening of foreign fiscal policies accounts
for about a 10 percent appreciation of the dollar
in this period, while the easing of u.s. fiscal
policy contributed about another 20 percent.
Together, these two factors accounted for about
half of the real trade-weighted dollar's 60 percent
appreciation in this period.
After 1985, the directions of both u.s. and foreign
fiscal policies did not change, thereby contribut-
ing neither to an appreciation nor a depreciation
ofthe dollar. Consequently, other factors, such as
differential movements in U.s. and foreign mone-
tary policies, explain the sharp decline in the
dollar's value from 1985 to 1988. These are
explored in the subsequent Letter.
Policy alternatives
Some have suggested that controls over inter-
national capital flows should be used to prevent
large swings in exchange rates such as have
occurred since 1976. The analysis presented here
suggests that even if such a policy could be
implemented, it would not insulate economies
from the forces that underlie these movements in
the exchange rate.
The San Francisco model shows that the swings
in the dollar during much of the floating-rate
period to a large extent were the result of diver-
gent fiscal policies at home and abroad. Thus, a
policy that prevented inflows of foreign capital
merely would have transferred the "crowding
out" of private expenditures associated with the
larger U.S. fiscal deficit from the tradeable goods
sector to interest sensitive sectors like housing,
other consumer durables, and business invest-
ment. In addition, the burden of a budget deficit
on future generations would have been larger
because of an inefficient allocation of capital.
This would have occurred because controls over
foreign capital inflows deprive the economy of a
lower cost source of capital.
As an alternative to capital controls, some have
advocated a return to a system of fixed exchange
rates. Again, such an approach does not elimi-
nate the need for real economic adjustments
associated with divergent fiscal policies. Under
a fixed exchange rate system, an expansionary
fiscal policy in the U.S. would tend to produce
large capital inflows and a balance of payments
surplus. To correct the payments surplus and still
maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate, the u.s.
would have to allow domestic prices to rise until
the real purchasing power of the u.S. dollar over
foreign goods compared with u.s. goods appre-
ciated by as much as under a floating rate sys-
tem. Clearly, it is less costly to let the nominal
exchange rate adjust under a floating rate system
than to force all of the adjustment on domestic
prices under fixed exchange rates.
In conclusion, shifts in fiscal policies require real
economic adjustment-whether through interest
rates if international flows of capital are con-
trolled, through domestic prices if exchange rates
are fixed, or through changes in the nominal
exchange rate if exchange rates are flexible. A
floating exchange rate regime with no capital
controls probably is the least costly mode of
adjustment to fiscal changes because it helps to
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